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The emergence of platforms, whether used inside fi rms, across supply 
chains, or as building blocks that act as engines of innovation and redefi ne 
industrial architectures, is a novel phenomenon aff ecting most industries 
today, from products to services. This book, the fi rst of its kind dedicated 
to the emerging fi eld of platform research, presents leading-edge contribu-
tions from top international scholars from strategy, economics, innova-
tion, organizations and knowledge management.
This book represents a milestone for the vibrant fi eld of platform 
research. It is the outcome of an ambitious international collaboration, 
regrouping and making connections between the research work of 24 
scholars, affi  liated with 19 universities, in seven countries over four con-
tinents. The novel insights assembled in the 14 chapters of this volume 
constitute a fundamental step towards an empirically based, nuanced 
understanding of the nature of platforms and the implications they hold 
for the evolution of industrial innovation.
But what exactly are platforms? Why should we care about them? And, 
why do we need a book about them?
WHY THIS BOOK?
We fi nd platforms in many industries, and certainly in all high-tech indus-
tries. Google, the Internet search engine, social networking sites such as 
Facebook, operating systems in cellular telephony, videogame consoles, 
but also payment cards, fuel-cell automotive technologies and some 
genomic technologies are all industry platforms. But perhaps the most 
media-covered platform (and archetypal example) is Microsoft Windows. 
Windows is also a great example of just how much we still don’t under-
stand about platforms.
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The two highly publicized antitrust lawsuits brought against Microsoft 
by the US Department of Justice and the European Commission have 
given rise to unprecedented levels of fi nes, in the hundreds of millions of 
US dollars, and have revealed profound diff erences in the opinions held 
by, on the one hand, the fi rms involved, and on the other by the regulatory 
authorities. The disagreements did not stop there: the US and European 
regulatory authorities upheld very diff erent rulings. In fact, very few 
experts agreed with each other in the course of these lawsuits, which have 
been the setting for highly contradictory arguments not only between 
managers and technologists of opposite camps – which was to be expected 
– but also between world-class scholars. Leading-edge economists and 
management scholars, in particular, have publicly taken radically diff erent 
stands as to whether Microsoft’s business practices were anticompetitive.
A central issue addressed in the lawsuits was the potentially adverse 
eff ect that certain business practices from Microsoft, a dominant fi rm 
in the operating systems market, could have on competition, industry 
innovation and social welfare. The controversial practices ranged from 
Microsoft’s decision to bundle its Windows software with complementary 
products to its decision to withhold information on how to connect com-
plementary products to Windows. The theoretical disagreement between 
economists was particularly noticeable, as, at least in principle, they 
based their logic on the same economic theory. What was the root of the 
problem?
Microsoft Windows is an industry platform – a building block, pro-
viding an essential function to a technological system – which acts as a 
foundation upon which other fi rms can develop complementary products, 
technologies or services. As a platform, it is subject to so-called network 
eff ects, which tend to reinforce in a cumulative manner early gained advan-
tages such as an installed base of users, or the existence of complementary 
products. In a positive feedback loop, new users get more benefi t from 
using Windows than from using an alternative platform, as it is already 
installed on many personal computers (PCs) and therefore facilitates 
exchange of fi les and interoperability in general. They also benefi t from 
a sizeable pool of existing Windows-compatible software, which makes 
Windows more useful. Software developers wishing to develop new soft-
ware applications will fi nd that, when deciding whether to make such new 
applications compatible with an alternative platform, they will be better 
off  designing for Windows, as most developers have done, since it already 
has a large installed base of users.
The cumulative nature of these network-fuelled dynamics implies that 
those platforms that make it past a certain tipping point tend to become 
really hard to dislodge. In a sense, as platforms’ market share grows, so 
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also grow their own barriers to entry. The extreme dominance of fi rms such 
as Microsoft, and more recently of Google, is unprecedented. The speed of 
innovation these fi rms have conducted, as well as the intensity and speed 
of innovation conducted in the industries (some prefer the word ecosys-
tem) they operate in, is also unprecedented. And all this is happening, with 
real-life consequences of enormous proportions, while many observers, 
managers, regulators or scholars are still coming to terms with the diff er-
ent facets of platforms, and trying to make sense of them. The unresolved 
diff erences between the economists mentioned above also invite us to look 
more deeply into this phenomenon, as it point to the limits of our existing 
knowledge and understanding. It is the contention of the authors of this 
book that, with platforms, we are facing a situation where existing theory 
is reaching its limits. As scholars, we felt that we collectively needed to 
push our understanding of this multifaceted phenomenon forward, with 
an inquisitive and open mind, but based on rigorous research and facts.
The emerging phenomenon of platforms aff ects industrial dynamics, 
creates new forms of competition, reveals new forms of collaborative 
innovation across fi rms and poses a host of new fundamental questions. 
These new questions include, but are not limited to, social welfare ques-
tions, industry dynamics questions and strategy questions. There are also 
questions about the management and the design of platforms, their impact 
on international competition, as well as their implications for an economy 
of services.
Citizens, consumers and regulators care about social welfare ques-
tions, such as: how can consumers enjoy the benefi ts from innovation 
created by dominant platform fi rms without letting this dominance get 
out of control? How can we achieve a more nuanced understanding of the 
respective impact of competition and of inter-fi rm collaboration, and par-
ticularly of collaborative innovation, on social welfare? For example, how 
can we assess the possible tradeoff s between benefi ts from competition and 
benefi ts from innovation? How do we evaluate tradeoff s between innova-
tion on the platform, performed by platform owners, and innovation on 
complements or modules, performed by complementors? What kinds of 
platform governance should be put in place to ensure the best functioning 
of platforms and ecoystems?
Then we have a set of industry dynamics questions: under which condi-
tions can we expect industry platforms to emerge? What forms do they 
take, in what context? And then, there are of course the strategic questions, 
which are the ones managers and investors care about, as they are linked 
to fi rms’ performance: how can fi rms succeed in the new platform game? 
Which capabilities are needed? When should fi rms open up their technolo-
gies and processes, or when should they adopt proprietary strategies? Is 
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there a continuum between ‘open’ and ‘closed’? How do we know which 
strategy is best, given our industry’s and fi rm’s circumstances?
Last, there are questions related to the management and design of plat-
forms, as well as questions about implications for international competi-
tion and division of labour. For example: how to manage the exploratory 
processes to create a platform? How to manage platform development 
projects? How to manage the creation of knowledge associated with the 
collective innovation practices? And, last but not least, what are the impli-
cations of all of this for competition and innovation in services? This book 
uncovers many such questions – and off ers some answers.
As the editor of this book, I would say that if there was one idea that I 
wish readers would take away with them as they start thinking seriously 
about platforms, and about what is unique about them, it would be the 
following: platforms invite us to examine carefully the intimate interac-
tions between technology and business, and in particular between the 
structure of technology and the modalities of business interaction. If this 
book manages to identify and highlight these interactions, it will have pre-
sented a persuasive argument for why we cannot aff ord to take technology 
as static, monolithic, exogenous, or as simply the precinct of engineers. 
That will be a major achievement, as it runs against not only common 
practice within organizations, but also entrenched intellectual refl exes 
within academia.
Sometime towards the end of the nineteenth century, the modern indus-
trial fi rm was born, and with it came a new separation into distinct spheres 
of the engineers on the one hand, with their instruments, language and 
knowledge, focusing on creating products, and the business managers on 
the other, focusing on clients, transactions and markets. As those of us 
who have worked in fi rms know from experience, these people talk diff er-
ent languages, and in many organizations don’t really talk to each other. 
Further, the separation of these spheres has also been found in academia. 
The economists of the twentieth century could relatively safely assume 
technology away in their models as a mere production function, and many 
management scholars have done so too. Markets and industries have been 
assumed to exist, products have been assumed to exist, and their uses were 
assumed to be known as well: all of these (industries, markets, products 
and uses) have accustomed us to expect some degree of stability. Therefore 
questions such as ‘Where will market transactions take place?’, and ‘What 
will be the nature of these transactions?’, had rather obvious answers.
However, when one observes the constantly evolving nature of plat-
forms such as Windows or Google, it seems that their owners are not just 
part of one industry (computing), but instead able to enter seamlessly 
into other markets such as cellular telephony or media content. While the 
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content and the uses of the platform product change constantly, one real-
izes that some of our old assumptions simply don’t hold. We shall have 
to think about what it is in the structure of the technology (which we can 
also call its architecture) that facilitates or hinders the emergence of new 
markets and new types of transactions. One of the points of contention of 
Microsoft and of the economists on its side was to object, on the basis of 
principle, that no regulator should have the right to intervene in product 
design.1 This claim seems obvious and legitimate to many economists: 
the design of the product should be the prerogative of the fi rm! However, 
when product design (which is, precisely, the domain of technology struc-
turing and architecture), in the hands of a dominant fi rm, aff ects the sheer 
possibility of existence of markets, then perhaps the regulator should be 
allowed to have a look – and a say.
But of course then we enter uncharted territory – where we cannot 
assume that collaboration between fi rms is necessarily a price-fi xing, col-
luding endeavour, and where competition and collaboration each play 
a role less simple than we have been used to. Where the regulator was 
understood to be the guarantor that competition would be free to play 
its course, we now face situations when, if unchecked, competition can 
create adverse conditions for innovation and for consumers. Again, this is 
uncharted territory, and this is precisely why we need rigorously derived, 
preferably empirically based, new knowledge that addresses these new 
issues head on. This book attempts to do just that.
OBJECTIVES OF THIS BOOK AND HOW IT CAME TO 
EXIST
I conceived of this project because I realized that, over the past ten 
years or so, since I completed my doctoral work on platform leadership 
(Gawer, 2000) and published my fi rst book on the topic with Michael 
Cusumano (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002), many individual researchers 
had made remarkable progress, each in his or her fi eld, that could contrib-
ute towards a better understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon of 
platforms. It appeared to me that there was an as-yet-unrecognized com-
munity of researchers working in diff erent universities and using diff erent 
approaches, a few of whom knew each other (or each other’s work). There 
were also others who did not know each other, but would certainly benefi t 
if they were put in contact.
I discussed my project with publisher Edward Elgar, and his early per-
sonal support and commitment were invaluable. It was most rewarding 
that the great majority of book contributors I had in mind responded 
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enthusiastically to my invitation to write a chapter either individually or as 
a team. As my intention was not only to stimulate new research in this fi eld 
by off ering a publication opportunity to these top researchers, but also to 
contribute as much as possible to the advancement of the fi eld, I thought 
of a way for these diverse researchers to enrich their own thinking by incor-
porating each other’s insights into their own chapters. I conceived there-
fore of organizing a conference, to take place roughly mid-course between 
the time researchers started to work on their chapter and the delivery date 
of the manuscript, and so, crucially, at a time when they would be actively 
engaged in the writing process. The objective of this conference was to 
give each book contributor an opportunity to get feedback from fellow 
contributors – as well as to learn from their presentations – at a time that 
was propitious for these insights to be refl ected in the end result. As each 
chapter can be seen as a module of the overall book, this conference aimed 
to increase the integration of the chapters, to achieve an output whose 
quality would be better than the sum of its parts.
The fi rst international conference on Platforms, Markets and Innovation 
took place in June 2008 at Imperial College Business School, London, 
my home institution, and was a great success. It featured the book con-
tributors, from all over the world, who presented and/or discussed the 
working chapters to/with each other and to an 80-strong audience of other 
researchers, managers and students. It also featured a panel discussion 
between researchers and top executives from IBM, Intel, Microsoft and 
British Telecom. The conference was also an opportunity for this new 
community of researchers to meet in one place and get to know each other. 
Many authors confi rmed – and I can testify – that most chapters benefi ted 
from this group discussion.
For readers who are familiar with how platforms work, they will have 
recognized in the vision and the design of this book several themes that 
are part of platforms thinking, and that are dear to my heart: creating a 
platform, stimulating others to innovate towards the collective creation of 
an output that is better through coordination, while preserving individual 
incentives.
CONTENT OF THIS VOLUME
The book comprises 14 chapters, and is divided into three parts. Part I 
presents an overview of platforms. Part II focuses on specifi c questions 
related to opening or closing platforms, as well as on platform governance 
issues. Part III focuses on platform management, design and knowledge 
issues.
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Chapter 1, this Introduction, situates the book and summarizes its 
content.
In Chapter 2, Carliss Y. Baldwin and C. Jason Woodard set an ambi-
tious agenda: to present a unifi ed view of platforms, cutting across the 
diff erent streams of literature (product development, technology strategy 
and industrial economics) in which the term has been used. Their chapter 
aims to shed light on the relationships between platforms and the systems 
in which they are embedded, in order to better understand fi rms and 
industries where platforms play an important role. The authors defi ne a 
platform as a set of stable components that supports variety and evolvabil-
ity in a system by constraining the linkages among the other components. 
Although the term ‘platform’ is used in diverse ways that seem diffi  cult to 
reconcile, Baldwin and Woodard fi nd that the fundamental architecture 
behind all platforms is essentially the same: the system is partitioned into 
a set of ‘core’ components with low variety and a complementary set of 
‘peripheral’ components with high variety. The low-variety components 
constitute the platform. They are the long-lived elements of the system 
and thus implicitly or explicitly establish the system’s interfaces, the rules 
governing interactions among the diff erent parts. This underlying archi-
tectural unity motivates the authors’ eff ort to develop a common set of 
analytical tools for studying platforms and the industries that produce 
them. Among the most important tools are representation schemes – in 
other words, ways to draw pictures of platform architectures. The authors 
discuss approaches from three diff erent literatures: network graphs from 
organization theory; design structure matrices from engineering design; 
and layer maps from technology strategy. The chapter concludes by 
addressing four questions: fi rst, when is a platform architecture prefer-
able to allowing all components to vary arbitrarily? Second, when can a 
platform and its peripheral components (complements) remain within the 
control of a single fi rm? Third, when should a fi rm allow or encourage 
outsiders to develop complements to a platform it controls? And fourth, if 
a fi rm does allow – or is forced to accept – external complementors, over 
which components of the system should it strive to retain control?
In Chapter 3, I aim to answer two research questions: (1) under which 
conditions can we expect industrial platform dynamics to emerge and 
unfold? (2) In the context of platform industry dynamics, what kind of 
platform strategies should fi rms devise, depending on whether they are 
incumbents or new entrants? To answer to the fi rst question, I set out to 
present a new typology of platforms, which identifi es the context in which 
diff erent types of platforms appear. Platforms are designed and used in 
three main settings: inside fi rms; across supply chains; or as industry plat-
forms – when they are the building blocks that act as engines of innovation 
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and redefi ne industrial architectures. I then suggest an ‘evolutionary 
perspective on platform emergence’, and identify circumstances under 
which internal platforms evolve into supply chain platforms, which then 
evolve further into industry platforms. To answer the second question on 
platform strategies, I build on Gawer and Cusumano’s (2008) concepts 
of ‘coring’ and ‘tipping’, and further specify the combinations of these 
that should be best suited to new entrants and to incumbents, depending 
on characteristics of the industry they operate in or wish to enter. I also 
suggest that fi rms’ ‘design capabilities’ (i.e. whether a fi rm’s design capa-
bility is to be an integrator/system assembler or a specialist/component 
maker) should have a decisive impact on which strategy to pursue. I con-
clude with implications and further questions for the study of platforms 
in services.
In Chapter 4, Fernando F. Suarez and Michael A. Cusumano examine 
a fascinating but as-yet-understudied aspect of platforms emergence and 
competition: the role of services. They note that the platform literature 
has grown out of innovation and new product development studies, which 
have tended to overlook the role of services. The authors focus on three 
questions: what is the potential role of services in the outcome of platform 
battles in product industries? What is the importance of services in plat-
form-mediated markets versus other markets? And which types of fi rms are 
more likely to produce services in platform-mediated industries and why? 
The authors identify several roles that services play: fi rst, they can be used 
to facilitate adoption, either by lowering adoption risk or through subsidy. 
Second, delivering services implies a close interaction with consumers, 
which provides useful feedback for further platform innovation. Third, 
the authors off er several examples where services enhance the value of the 
platform through a variety of indirect network eff ects, and can also act 
as customer retention mechanisms. In the empirical part of their chapter, 
Suarez and Cusumano observe that in the software products industry, 
platform markets such as operating systems, multimedia, and videogames, 
services revenues do not overtake product revenue – suggesting that this 
may be caused by the resilience of platform markets to commoditization. 
Last, the authors discuss circumstances under which the platform fi rms are 
likely to provide the services themselves rather than through a network of 
external service providers.
In Chapter 5, David S. Evans explores how entrepreneurs who start 
multi-sided platforms must secure enough customers on both sides, 
and in the right proportions, to provide enough value to each group of 
customers and to achieve sustainable growth. Evans’s chapter, precisely 
because it focuses on the problem faced by start-up entrepreneurs who 
have to ‘ignite’ markets, is an important and welcome contribution to the 
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literature on multi-sided platforms – which have so far tended by and large 
to assume that the markets on each side of the platform already exist, and 
have focused almost exclusively on how to price access to the platform to 
encourage adoption. In Evans’s chapter, the entrepreneurs must secure 
‘critical mass’ to ignite the growth of their platforms, otherwise their 
platform implodes. The chapter details a number of strategies available 
to entrepreneurs to reach this critical mass. These include the ‘zig-zag’ – 
which involves successive accretions of customers on both sides to build 
up the value to both sides – and the ‘two-step’ – which involves getting 
enough members of one side on board fi rst and then members of the other 
side. These strategies can usefully employ many of the tactics used for new 
product introductions by non-platform businesses. The relevant strate-
gies depend in large part on whether the nature of the platform requires 
securing participation by both platform sides at launch, as is the case with 
dating venues; whether it is possible to acquire one side before approach-
ing the other side, as is the case with search engines; and whether it is 
necessary to make pre-commitments to one side to induce them to make 
investments, as is the case with videogames. The chapter concludes with 
an analysis of two sets of examples: B2B (business-to-business) exchanges, 
and social networking websites Friendster and Facebook.
Part II focuses on specifi c questions related to opening or closing plat-
forms, as well as on platform governance issues.
In Chapter 6, Thomas R. Eisenmann, Geoff rey Parker and Marshall 
Van Alstyne off er a systematic and rigorously derived set of strategies and 
guidelines for managers on how to make the right choices about opening 
or closing mature platforms. Selecting optimal levels of openness is crucial 
for fi rms that create and maintain platforms. Decisions to open a platform 
entail tradeoff s between adoption and appropriability. Opening a platform 
can spur adoption by harnessing network eff ects, reducing users’ concerns 
about lock-in, and stimulating production of diff erentiated goods that 
meet the needs of user segments. At the same time, opening a platform 
typically reduces users’ switching costs and increases competition among 
platform providers, making it more diffi  cult for them to appropriate rents 
from the platform. The authors focus on a subset of platforms: those that 
exploit network eff ects by mediating transactions between platform users. 
The conclusions from this chapter are the following: platform openness 
occurs at multiple levels depending on whether participation is unre-
stricted at the (1) demand-side-user (end-user), (2) supply-side-user (appli-
cation developer), (3) platform provider or (4) platform sponsor levels. 
These distinctions in turn give rise to multiple strategies for managing 
openness. Horizontal strategies for managing openness entail licensing, 
joint standard setting and technical interoperability with rival platforms. 
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Vertical strategies for managing openness entail backward compatibility, 
platform and category exclusivity, and absorption of complements. Each 
strategy grants or restricts access for one of the four platform participants. 
When proprietary platforms mature, they are often opened to encompass 
new providers. Once network mobilization winds down and free-rider 
problems are no longer salient, proprietary platform sponsors may fi nd 
it attractive to license additional providers to serve market segments with 
diverse needs. Naturally, these new providers will seek a say in the plat-
form’s direction: they will try to force a previously proprietary platform to 
open its governance. Likewise, as shared platforms mature, their renewal 
may hinge on partners ceding power to a central authority that can set pri-
orities and settle disputes over who will provide next-generation technolo-
gies. This closes the governance of a previously open platform. Thus forces 
tend to push both proprietary and shared platforms over time towards 
hybrid governance models typifi ed by central control over platform tech-
nology and shared responsibility for serving users.
In Chapter 7, Kevin J. Boudreau and Andrei Hagiu make an impor-
tant contribution to the literature on multi-sided platforms by focusing 
on the importance and variety of non-price instruments plaform owners 
use to regulate and govern their platform. Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) 
are characterized by interactions and interdependence between their 
multiple sides, and the existence of network eff ects. The thrust of prior 
work in the MSP literature has focused on the question of how to get the 
diff erent sides around an MSP ‘on board’ in large numbers, while setting 
up a pricing model that maximizes platform profi ts. Overall, the MSP 
literature has emphasized arm’s-length pricing as the central strategic 
instrument used by platform owners to intermediate the ecosystem of 
users and complementors surrounding an MSP. A number of provocative 
analyses, however, have suggested a richer picture of the role of MSPs 
and limitations to arm’s-length market interactions. Metaphors of ‘open’ 
and ‘closed’ platforms convey something of how restrictive or liberal a 
platform may be in its dealings with surrounding constituents. But also, 
several studies have documented a variety of roles played by platform 
owners, including ensuring ‘coherent’ technical development and coordi-
nation among contributors to an MSP ecosystem; designing the technical 
architecture that frames interaction; encouraging complementors to make 
investments; and generally ‘managing’ and ‘maintaining the health’ of the 
ecosystem, such as by using the non-price levers such as the ‘four levers of 
platform leadership’ which include: fi rm boundaries and internal organi-
zation of the platform owner, product technology and relationships with 
platform participants. The nature of these activities clearly goes beyond 
governing economic activity solely within the boundaries of platform 
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owners and extends to rule making and regulating the conduct of fi rms 
beyond their economic boundaries, as suggested by several authors, who 
characterize MSPs as a ‘licensing authority’ that ‘regulates connections 
among ecosystem members’ so as to ‘increase diversity and productivity’; 
or go as far as to speculate that ‘the monopolist [platform owner] plays a 
role like that of a “public interest” regulator’. The primary contribution 
of Boudreau and Hagiu’s chapter is to present evidence supporting these 
notions of a regulatory role of MSPs that goes well beyond price setting 
and includes imposing rules and constraints, creating inducements and 
otherwise shaping behaviours. These various non-price instruments essen-
tially solve what would otherwise be (multi-sided) ‘market failures’. The 
authors use four primary case studies to illustrate these points. Two case 
studies are digital MSPs: Facebook and TopCoder. To emphasize some 
level of generality of their analysis, they also examine two non-digital 
platforms: the Roppongi Hills ‘mini-city’ in Tokyo, Japan, and Harvard 
Business School.
In Chapter 8, Melissa A. Schilling focuses on the tradeoff s between dif-
fusion and protection of technology platforms. In industries with increas-
ing returns, fi rms are sometimes encouraged to liberally diff use their 
technology platforms (through, for example, open source or liberal licens-
ing arrangements) to increase their likelihood of becoming the dominant 
design. However, these fi rms face several dilemmas: if they liberally diff use 
the technology to would-be competitors, they relinquish the opportunity 
to capture monopoly rents when and if their technology emerges as a dom-
inant design. Furthermore, once control of a technology is relinquished, it 
can be very hard to regain. Finally, liberal diff usion of the technology can 
result in the fragmentation of the technology platform. These dilemmas 
raise the following questions: when incompatible technologies compete 
for the position of dominant design, what factors will determine whether 
one or more competitors choose to adopt a more ‘open’ technology strat-
egy? How does a fi rm decide what level of ‘openness’ will maximize the 
technology’s chances for survival and the fi rm’s long-term profi tability? 
This chapter systematically examines how either open or closed technolo-
gies can rise to the position of dominant design. The conclusions of this 
chapter help move beyond the appropriability versus open debate by 
examining the more subtly nuanced benefi ts of diff erent positions along a 
‘control continuum’, and provide a systematic tool for managers to assess 
the benefi ts and costs/risks of adopting a strategy at various points along 
the control continuum.
In Chapter 9, Shane Greenstein concludes Part II by off ering a rich 
and nuanced essay focusing on the development of commercial Internet, 
as a unique historical setting allowing in-depth analysis of the relative 
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benefi ts of open versus closed practices. The structure of the commercial 
Internet cut against the prevailing opinion of many executives in comput-
ing and communications in the mid-1990s, which contended that platform 
leadership from a commercial organization (à la Microsoft and Intel) 
was necessary for a thriving and growing market. In contrast, the most 
vocal participants in Internet governance revelled in the freedom of the 
Internet’s development processes, stressing that it placed comparatively 
fewer restrictions on the fl ow of technical information. Some even pointed 
to the PC market as a model of what they were trying to avoid. The 
debate still persists today about how and why computing platforms thrive 
with and without commercial leadership. Greenstein’s essay illuminates 
these issues by returning to the fi rst market in which they arose and by 
re- examining the core issue: what would have been diff erent about the 
Internet if it had been organized as a proprietary commercial platform? 
His answer comes in two steps. The fi rst step defi nes ‘open’ in the context 
of the time, namely, comparing Microsoft’s development of Windows 95 
with similar processes for developing the Internet. The second step exam-
ines how three specifi c features of the Internet might have changed had 
its processes been less open: the transition from the research-oriented to 
the commercial Internet; the degree of innovation around the time of the 
transition; and the events leading to structural change in the commercial 
Internet market. Greenstein concludes that openness did not do some of 
the things for which it is often credited, such as make the Internet more 
innovative. However, he also concludes that openness did play a special 
role in shaping outcomes in the commercial Internet at this time – in 
encouraging participation in development of Internet infrastructure and in 
fostering structural change in the provision of commercial software.
Part III focuses on platform management, design and knowledge issues. 
It comprises fi ve chapters from authors based in the UK, Italy, France, 
Sweden and Japan.
In Chapter 10, Mari Sako off ers us what will probably become a seminal 
article on supply chain platforms. Sako’s chapter presents an empirically 
based contribution to the theory of supply chain platforms through an 
in-depth case study of automotive supplier parks in Brazil. Supplier parks 
represent a recent template for organizing in the global automotive indus-
try. The template combines outsourcing by automakers and co-location 
of suppliers on automakers’ sites. Sako draws on evidence from three 
Brazilian supplier parks, Volkswagen Resende, General Motors Gravataí 
and Ford Camaçari, to analyse the causes and consequences of outsourc-
ing and co-location for the governance of the fi rm, relations with suppli-
ers, and labour–management relations. She examines three dimensions 
theoretically and empirically, namely the degree of task outsourcing, the 
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pattern of asset ownership and the nature of relational governance. In 
theory, task modularity facilitates ownership modularity (that is, asset 
ownership disintegration). But evidence from three major supplier parks 
in Brazil reveals a diversity of local arrangements, with a negative cor-
relation between task outsourcing and asset outsourcing. This fi nding is 
explained by combining insights from the engineering design literature 
and the organization economics literature. In particular, asset ownership 
is one of several ways in which control and incentives may be structured. 
Moreover, the diversity in arrangements is also explained by diff erent 
combinations of corporate strategy and state policy, as well as by the 
emergence of diff erent local labour market institutions.
In Chapter 11, Pascal Le Masson, Benoit Weil and Armand Hatchuel 
explore how industry platforms can be designed using specifi c collabora-
tive relationships that also take the form of platforms. In several sectors, 
the architecture of industry is tending to loosen or even disappear: ‘smart 
grids’ in electricity supply, biomaterials and home networking in telecom-
munications and consumer electronics are all examples of new industrial 
contexts in search of industry platforms. In such situations, who is the 
industrial architect, i.e., who provides the industry platform? How do 
platforms emerge and how do companies contribute to the process? The 
literature insists on the importance of a platform ‘core’, performing one 
essential function or solving one essential problem of the system, without 
investigating how this core can be identifi ed or designed. The authors 
explore the issues raised by these collaborations for platform design using 
a multiple case study in four diff erent industries: biomaterials, microelec-
tronics, aeronautics and biotechnologies. In all four cases, a platform 
design process was followed longitudinally. The authors suggest that the 
collaborations for platform design consist not only in delivering an indus-
try platform but in positioning this platform potential into a strategic 
landscape, characterized by alternative platform strategies, the capabilities 
enabling these platform strategies and the values of these platform strate-
gies for the partners. They suggest that collaborations for platform design 
have to manage three main processes: (1) value creation, in order to iden-
tify a product platform for the industry, but also to evaluate this platform 
compared to alternatives, and to integrate all possible alternatives into 
a strategic mapping process; (2) knowledge production and learning by 
involving partners, off ering support for various experiments and provid-
ing specifi c devices for knowledge production; and (3) the interests of each 
of the partners by simultaneously creating value at the industry level and 
increasing the value of the partners’ assets.
In Chapter 12, Stefano Brusoni and Andrea Prencipe focus on the 
process of defi ning new internal platforms. They observe that it is when 
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platforms are defi ned that relationships are established among people and 
units; new bodies of understanding and practice are generated and old 
ones discarded; information fi lters are implemented to selectively retain 
what is defi ned as relevant information. The process of defi ning a new 
platform is, however, a major and highly risky undertaking in which fi rms 
engage very rarely. It is diffi  cult to develop routines and heuristics capable 
of guiding such activities (exactly because they happen so rarely). Yet any 
wrong decision taken at this time will have long-lasting eff ects on fi rm 
profi tability and eventual survival. The authors argue that the successful 
introduction of new platforms depends on the implementation of consist-
ent changes across the domains of product, organization and knowledge. 
In a case study in the aeronautics industry, they fi nd that these changes 
are implemented by organizations that act as cross-domain catalysts 
through the mediating role of key people who span all three domains. The 
aircraft engine industry case illustrates the introduction of a new platform 
architecture in a high-tech setting. The evidence describes radical changes 
that revolutionized the products and the manufacturing processes. There 
were ‘make-or-break’ decisions that implied the defi nition of a new ‘way 
of doing things’. Brusoni and Prencipe off er some implications for prac-
tice: they argue that key individuals play a fundamental role in enacting 
cross-domain rewirings. Leading fi gures that played a central role in the 
connection of the knowledge, organization and product domains were 
senior engineers with long careers in the industry. It was their involvement 
in the minutiae of everyday production that enabled them to cumula-
tively develop a systemic understanding of technologies, products and the 
overall industry. This is a major point to consider if one notes how easily 
manufacturing activities are now being outsourced to low-cost countries.
In Chapter 13, Ramsin Yakob and Fredrik Tell investigate possible 
approaches to problem solving in product platform development. The 
ability to manage the problem-solving process is a key capability for 
reduced product development cycle time. The development of platforms is 
a complex endeavour requiring the organizing and utilization and involve-
ment of a number of diff erent functional areas of a fi rm and the inclusion 
of a variety of expertise, usually in cross-functional development projects. 
Problems and errors are an inherent part of any development work carried 
out in such projects. As the complexity of the system increases due to the 
increasing number of components and interdependences, emerging prob-
lems and errors become gradually more diffi  cult to solve. The authors 
envisage that the more complex the hierarchical confi guration of product 
platforms, the more complex the problems and errors encountered in 
their development will be. Previous research has distinguished between 
directional and heuristic problem-solving strategies. The authors discuss 
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the appropriateness of these two problem-solving strategies in product 
platform development projects. The analysis is grounded theoretically as 
well as in an empirical study of two product platform projects: one in the 
telecommunications industry and one in the automotive industry. The 
fi ndings indicate that in developing capabilities for the complex problem 
solving characteristic of product platform development projects it is 
paramount to narrow the search process between errors identifi ed and 
the problem underlying those errors. The successful management of such 
compression increases the probability of fi nding remedies for errors, as it 
reduces the problem landscape in which solutions can be found. For this 
both heuristic and directional search processes are important.
In Chapter 14, authors Hirofumi Tatsumoto, Koichi Ogawa and 
Takahiro Fujimoto focus on the eff ects of technological platforms on the 
international division of labour. Their chapter focuses on variables such 
as the characteristics of the platform, the mechanism through which the 
platform is diff used, and the eff ect it has on the international division of 
labour through an architectural analysis of the case of Intel’s platform 
business in Taiwan in the 1990s. The authors defi ne the separation eff ect 
of the platform as a mechanism that separates the technologies used in a 
quasi-modular architecture product into completely modular and integral 
technologies. The separation eff ect is derived from the dual nature of the 
platform: the completely integral architecture inside it and the completely 
modular architecture outside it. This leads to a diff erence in the speed of 
technology diff usion between the fi nished product level and the platform 
level, and brings about a production shift of fi nished products from the 
developed country to developing countries, while the platform remains 
in the developed country. With the rapid diff usion of technology, the 
adoption of a platform leads to a quick expansion of production in devel-
oping-country fi rms. The cost reductions in these fi rms bring aff ordable 
prices and help to create a huge global market, such as the BRIC (Brazil, 
Russian, India and China) markets. As a result, the platform fundamen-
tally changes the international division of labour by noticeably strength-
ening the new model of economic collaboration between developing and 
developed countries. The growth of the platform destroys the advantages 
of traditional fi rms in developed countries and encourages entry into the 
market by new fi rms in developing countries.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This book off ers a truly multidisciplinary account of the multifaceted 
phenomenon of platforms, and it has been a privilege to be part of the 
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community of scholars who have contributed to it. This is the outcome 
of an ambitious programme of international collaboration, but, mostly, 
all authors join me in hoping that this is just a beginning. We hope this 
volume will become a reference for students and researchers, and be 
readable enough for managers who care about the issues of innovation, 
competition, fi rms’ performance, design and technological development. 
We hope the insights assembled in this volume will be used as a founda-
tion – dare we say as a platform – for future enquiring minds to improve 
our responses and uncover new questions. There is much more work to be 
done. But for now, enjoy your reading!
NOTE
1. In its 2008 Annual Report Microsoft stated: ‘The European Commission closely scru-
tinizes the design of high-volume Microsoft products and the terms on which we make 
certain technologies used in these products, such as fi le formats, programming interfaces, 
and protocols, available to other companies. In 2004, the Commission ordered us to 
create new versions of Windows that do not include certain multimedia technologies 
and to provide our competitors with specifi cations for how to implement certain pro-
prietary Windows communications protocols in their own products. The Commission’s 
impact on product design may limit our ability to innovate in Windows or other products 
in the future, diminish the developer appeal of the Windows platform, and increase our 
product development costs’ (emphasis added).
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